The Court did not, however, prohibit all regulation of commercial speech. The government could place reasonable restrictions upon the time, place, and manner of speech2 and could also enforce regulations that dealt with false, deceptive, or misleading advertising. The Court pointed out that commercial speech protection might not exist for proposed illegal transactions. It also noted that a different standard 2The "time, place, and manner" standard is applied in cases of fully protected speech. Governments can restrict when, where, and how speech is delivered, provided that the regulation does not affect the content of the speech. Such regulations are described as "content neutral."
Commercial Speech Test
Is the expression made primarily for commercial gain-the "primary purpose" test? If yes, then speech is accorded less protection. Does the expression deal with matters that are primarily of public rather than private (e.g., financial) concern? If yes, then speech is protected. Reacting to Posadas's objection, the Puerto Rico Superior Court rewrote the regulations to try to resolve the first amendment problems. The revised standards relaxed some of the regulatory agency's restrictions, but nonetheless allowed use of the word casino only where the trade name of the hotel was used. The standards also required previous approval of the Tourism Company for advertising and publicity addressed to tourists within Puerto Rico.
Does
The Court declared that advertising of casino gambling could be forestalled because casino gambling itself could be banned. So where the underlying commercial endeavor could be outlawed, the government can forbid promotional activities regarding the endeavor. Thus, Posadas substantially reduced first amendment support for commercial communications by upholding government authority for both previous restraint and censorship of truthful advertising for a legal service.
The regulatory expansion of Posadas continued in San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee (1987) (SFAA v. USOC). The USOC had been granted exclusive use of the word Olympic by the Amateur Sports Act of 1978. Without USOC's permission, SFAA had begun using the term in promotional materials to create interest in the proposed Gay Olympic Games. The USOC obtained a permanent injunction, preventing SFAA from using the word Olympic in any of its activities,3 and SFAA appealed.
In finding for the USOC, the Court stated that the "possibility for confusion as to sponsorship is obvious" (SFAA v. The Court found for the attorney, stating that the First Amendment does not permit a complete ban on some forms of commercial speech simply because they are more effective than other methods. The Court also decided that eliminating such communications would be inconsistent with Posadas,s although such a letter could result in isolated abuses, that is, mislead some people. The Court concluded that direct mail advertising is dissimilar to personal solicitation because the latter provides many more opportunities for undue seller influence. Direct mail, because it leaves a tangible record, is also more open to public scrutiny and proper regulation by authorities than is personal selling. Thus, whereas the Court allowed direct mail selling, it introduced reasoning that eventually could be used to regulate face-toface selling under the First Amendment.
The Court reaffirmed government power to ban promotional activities in Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v. Fox (1989). The trustees had issued regulations that prohibited certain commercial activities on any university property. Fox, a student hosting product demonstration parties in dormitories, contested the regulations. The trial court upheld the trustees's regulations, which were overturned on appeal.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the appellate judgment and remanded the case for consideration of whether the regulations were adequate under the fourth step of Central Hudson. The Court opined, however, that demonstration 4Regarding the impact on noncommercial speech, he noted that USOC has permitted the word Olympic to be used in reference to young persons (Junior Olympics and Explorer Olympics) and handicapped people (Special Olympics), while disallowing its use in reference to senior citizens and bodybuilders (SFAA v. USOC 1987, p. 2999). He asserted that restrictions such as these amount to arbitrary content regulation of speech, which is completely at odds with first amendment prohibition of restrictions that are not content neutral.
5Because the practice of law cannot be banned, attorney advertising must therefore be lawful. parties amounted to commercial speech that proposed a lawful transaction and was not misleading. The Court thereby upheld the power of a government body to prohibit the nondeceptive selling of legal products in an individual's residence. Fox noticeably extended the reach of the fourth element of the Central Hudson test from "no more extensive than necessary" to the "reasonableness" of the regulation in the context of its objectives. The Fox Court explicitly noted that it will not apply a "least restrictive means possible" analysis to commercial speech.
Then, in Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission of Illinois (1990), the Court negated an Illinois rule prohibiting attorney claims of being a certified legal specialist. The Court found Peel's letterhead to be truthful, not misleading, and verifiable and therefore nondeceptive. The Court conceded that a state does have a right to prevent deception that might arise out of communications such as Peel's, but this interest was deemed insufficient to justify a categorical ban.
1993: Refining the Central Hudson Standard
The Supreme Court applied the Central Hudson standard in three 1993 commercial speech cases, probably causing more confusion than clarification. In City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network (1993) and Edenfield v. Fane (1993), the Court rejected a city ordinance prohibiting magazine and handbill news racks (while allowing newspaper racks) and overturned a Florida statute preventing accountants from soliciting clients in person and by phone, respectively. Although they met the first two prongs of the Central Hudson, both these rules failed the third prong, that is, neither standard directly advanced either governmental unit's asserted interests. Both governments could have achieved their interest in other ways that did not unreasonably restrict commercial speech.
Conversely, the Court upheld a federal law prohibiting radio stations from broadcasting lottery ads in states where lotteries are forbidden (US and FCC v. Edge Broadcasting Co. 1993). A radio station in North Carolina (which has no lottery), with 92% of its listeners living in Virginia (which has a lottery), challenged the federal statute. The Court accepted the state's argument without relying on any demonstrable evidence, contrary to Edenfield.
Taken together, Edenfield and City of Cincinnati require the government to support its position more thoroughly when banning certain forms of commercial speech. Edge Broadcasting, however, relaxes the evidentiary requirements for the state. Moreover, the Court has yet to clarify the term reasonable6 when applied to a law regulating commercial speech. Most product-specific communications typify so-called pure commercial speech. Product-line, product-family, and some forms of corporate image advertising would also be categorized as commercial speech. Thus, the majority of promotional efforts would seem to be properly classified as commercial speech. Gradation problems arise, however, when (1) the speaker is not a for-profit entity and/or is presumably neutral regarding the subject matter, or (2) the content of the speech includes topics that traditionally are both commercial and noncommercial. Such speech is labeled mixed and may be fully protected because of its noncom7City ofLadue v. Gilleo (1994) also includes some comments about commercial speech. mercial aspects or treated subordinately due to its commercial component.
Not-for-profit or neutral speakers. Many organizations that are legally organized as nonprofit institutions carry out fund-raising activities with full first amendment protection, except in cases of fraud.8 The most obvious examples are religious, political, and charitable groups.9 Consider billboards sponsored by an organization that feature a renowned evangelist. Suppose the message urges viewers to purchase expensive religious icons so as to be viewed more favorably by the deity worshiped by the evangelist. The religious nature of the source gives it first amendment protection despite the fund-raising nature of the communications.
Another relevant example for marketers relates to dealing with consumer interest groups or consumer watchdogs. These groups and individuals are generally allowed greater leeway in stating their positions about products than are the companies marketing these items. The Court's premise is that these sources of information do not stand to gain financially from their comments; hence, their positions are presumed to be neutral or more plausible than profit-oriented marketers. Thus, marketers encounter credibility problems when trying to negate the opinions (noncommercial speech) of presumably neutral sources, such as Consumer Reports (Redish 1990 , p. 49), with their own commercial statements.
Evaluating profit motives will be increasingly difficult to assess as complex business structures, such as strategic alliances, emerge. For example, several competing firms may establish a not-for-profit joint venture to obtain research economies of scale. The affiliated firms benefit if this research venture proclaims that the most advanced technology in a given area just happens to be that of the funding companies. The not-for-profit partnership is the source of the statement, but for-profit companies have underwritten the research. The Court is likely to view such statements as commercial speech, unless it is convinced that the joint venture is remote enough from its sponsors, that is, no common personnel, physically separate facilities, and minimal sponsor control over the research agenda. Given the same study and findings, Michigan would be given greater freedom to state its position than J&J, because the university's research is not done for the purpose of eventually marketing profitable products. If J&J mailed results of this research to health professionals, its communications would come under Food & Drug Administration examination, which would be more restrictive than a first amendment review. A J&J-sponsored press conference, because it involves disseminating information to the public through the news media, would be subject to greater scrutiny under first amendment guidelines. Full-page advertisements by J&J in magazines and newspapers, even if they described only the benefits of Retin-A, would likely be deemed commercial speech.ll Even if this is commercial speech, some analysts argue that the public interest component deserves full first amendment protection (Radner 1993 Table  1 ), truly clarifies the commercial speech conundrum. Thus, the threshold decision of whether certain communications amount to commercial speech can sometimes be a difficult one for the Court. Table 2 , along with a brief description of each.
The Court obviously will have a difficult time ensuring that all interests are maximized because of the inherent trade-offs involved. The right of a marketer to target advertisements to certain market segments might interfere with rights of those not wanting to see the ad or not wanting third parties to view the ads (Nesgos 1988). For example, for a variety of reasons some people may be offended by ads for contraceptives. Their inadvertent exposure to such ads is regarded as less important than the right of others to be informed about contraceptive alternatives and the right of contraceptive sellers to promote their products. Moreover, given broad public concern for minimizing the spread of AIDS, the recognized utility of contraceptive use has increased. However, if the ads are offensive in their execution, for example, vivid photography and colorful language, the Court may decide to protect society at large from such materials.
Thus, the Court must balance the various rights in the context of existing trends and societal values. If a cure for AIDS is developed and is eventually affordable to everyone, the rights of those objecting to contraceptive ads may begin to dominate again, resulting in restrictions on contraceptive advertisements. At that point, such ads may be prohibited from all broadcast media but might be permitted in an infor- Other situations may encompass only the rights of the parties directly involved in the dispute. For example, when states attempt to establish behavioral standards for professionals, for example, optometrists, physicians, and attorneys, they risk first amendment violations. After Edenfield (1993) accountants are allowed to approach potential clients in person or by telephone, but attorneys are not yet permitted to solicit this aggressively. The Court must determine how to protect exposed citizens who need legal counsel but who might be susceptible to persuasive legal arguments, while at the same time safeguarding the right of others (attorneys) to communicate with prospective clients.
The rationale of Central Hudson, which was extended considerably in Posadas, will be used to decide issues such as these. Assuming the commercial communications are lawful and not misleading (Central Hudson, step #1), the weight attached to governmental interest in regulating the questionable communications must be judged (step #2). Rarely will a regulation be expunged at this stage. The logic underlying the contested rule will almost always be reasonable in terms of face validity, and the governmental body's articulated reasons for enacting the statute will usually be well intended. Step #3 will also typically result in an affirmative answer: Most regulations advance the government's interests. In fact, the legislative process at all levels generally includes an analysis of the congruence between the government's goals and the functioning of the law.
Most important, the appropriateness of the commercial speech restrictions is finally evaluated by the Court. The test is whether the restrictions are reasonable or no more extensive than necessary not whether they are the least restrictive means possible. Thus, the Court must review arguments regarding alternative promotional formats and message content available to the marketer.
Impact of Commercial Speech Regulations on Promotional Decisions
At the present time, targeted promotional efforts aimed at informing interested and qualified prospects and customers receive the maximum commercial speech protection. Communications of demonstrable claims are generally also acceptable to the Court. This protection is decreased somewhat for highly persuasive efforts, especially if the seller is clearly more familiar with the product than buyers. Untargeted mass communications that attempt to do more than inform and that cannot be avoided by uninterested persons are closely scrutinized by the Court. Like marketers, the Court considers the impact of the commercial speech and its medium of delivery in applying Central Hudson. In reviewing statutes designed to control promotional alternatives, the Court has most often been critical of absolute bans because they are overly broad, thus failing the fourth step of Central Hudson; that is, statutes must not only effectively prevent unwanted commercial speech through media restrictions, but they must not impinge upon allowable noncommercial speech.
Attempts to regulate media have very consistently focused on the particular advantages of those media from the marketer's perspective. The Court has learned that a particular message is more effective when transmitted by one medium as opposed to another. The promotional activities most likely to be affected by commercial speech regulations are outdoor advertising, direct marketing, personal selling, and television advertising.
Outdoor Advertising
Numerous statutes have been enacted to limit or eliminate billboards and signs. Decisions dealing with these regulations often note that billboards and signs are publicly intrusive: They cannot be ignored or avoided due to their physical presence. The Court has issued enough opinions to date that could be used to draft legislation calling for the banishment of all commercial signs and billboards that are not within a few hundred feet of the establishment being advertised.12 Firms large enough to do business in multiple jurisdictions will face myriad regulations dealing with billboard advertising. Organizations that rely on outdoor advertising should begin to develop alternative, targeted forms of communication, especially in jurisdictions that are taking the lead in reducing visual clutter. 
Direct Marketing
Similarly, the private intrusiveness of direct marketing has made it a target of regulations aimed at diminishing market12The president of one firm that operates numerous billboards declared that he was already diversifying his business in anticipation of the day when outdoor advertising is banned or severely restricted (Shaw and Pearson 1994). ing efforts that are thought to be too aggressive or generally bothersome. Few first amendment challenges to direct mail statutes have been raised to date; however, this area is likely to parallel the progress observed relative to billboards and signs.13 Once legislators and regulators determine how to limit direct marketing efforts without infringing on noncommercial speech, Central Hudson provides broad discretionary power for severely reducing the variety and effectiveness of direct marketing. Regulations in this area will be particularly complex for marketers to anticipate because of the overlapping interests of several federal agencies, including the Federal Trade Commission, Federal Communications Commission, and the U.S. Postal Service.
Regulations will most likely be aimed at restricting mass mailings or randomly generated telephone contacts that are not based on the identification of high-potential prospects. To minimize the likelihood of regulations that qualify under the First Amendment, organizations that employ direct mail must secure appropriate mailing lists. Mail campaigns aimed at persons who meet exacting market profile criteria are likely to provoke the least resistance, because such mailings will yield the fewest formal complaints.
A similar admonition is relevant regarding unsolicited telephone selling. Because the phone lines that telemarketers use for commercial messages are paid for by consumers, their demands for restrictions are likely to be supported, at least until technology such as call-blocking is widely available (Cain 1994, p. 665).
Personal Selling
The activities of salespeople, although targeted at qualified prospects, have been affected by first amendment rulings. The cases related to the promotional efforts of attorneys can be conceptually extended to other salesperson-prospect situations. To date, attorneys are generally permitted to describe their expertise, but they cannot personally approach individuals who are plainly in need of legal assistance. The Court has reasoned that attorneys possess superior knowledge regarding the imminent legal dilemma and therefore might overstate the problem to gain business. Moreover, such consumers may be involved in emotionally charged situations that could interfere with their making sound decisions about retaining legal counsel The consumer is thus protected from being placed at a disadvantage by unscrupulous attorneys.
Other situations exist where the seller's knowledge exceeds that of the prospect relative to the offering in question. The potential for encroachment through regulation is considerable, particularly because the Court is more likely to allow regulations in situations where the commercial speech cannot be easily monitored by others. Thus, salesperson conduct is susceptible to regulation, because most salesperson-client interactions cannot be observed by third parties.
The current emphasis on ethical behavior by salespeople must be stressed by organizations in all industries so that external regulations are not imposed (Schneider and Johnson 13In Moser v. FCC (1993), a federal district court in Oregon outlawed a federal statute that allowed businesses to solicit customers over the phone only if they employed live operators (no computer dialing/messages). An appeal will probably be filed by the FCC. 1992), and the claims of salespeople should be factually correct and deal with issues that can be substantiated. Claims that are not verifiable, especially if they are common in industries or markets where sellers are obviously more knowledgeable than buyers, could lead to localized attempts at regulating salesperson speech to protect customers.
Television Advertising
The pervasive impact of television advertising has resulted in a number of regulations that prompted first amendment objections. Certain products (e.g., cigarettes, distilled spirits) are precluded from being advertised on television. The arguments here center on protecting certain vulnerable segments, generally children, from repeated exposure to product advertisements if they are deemed to be incapable of assessing a product's utility. Future regulations of televised advertising are likely to focus on certain product classes, with further emphasis on restricting ads for additional products during certain time segments.14 Summary After reestablishing protection of commercial speech under the First Amendment during the late 1970s, the U.S. Supreme Court has once again decided to limit this protection. The Central Hudson (1980) decision provided a fourpart test that has been used to restrict both the content and method of commercial communication. The Posadas (1986) extension of Central Hudson supplies additional reasoning to limit commercial speech even further.
Most first amendment commercial speech cases deal with efforts to constrain decisions regarding the type of advertising medium, with ad content occasionally being considered. At present, the Court is moving in the direction of diminishing the rights of the seller-advertiser. A continuation of this trend will affect all aspects of the promotional mix, leading Kozinski and Banner15 (1990, p. 653) to the following conclusion:
...the commercial speech doctrine...is not cost free. It gives a government a powerful weapon to suppress or control speech by classifying it as merely commercial. If you think carefully enough, you can find a commercial aspect to almost any first amendment case. Today's protected expression may become tomorrow's commercial speech.
